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The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and social expenditures in 
Europe: 
Do welfare state regimes matter? 
Abstract 
This paper estimates the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates (ITR) on 
capital income, labor income and consumption, and the share of social protection 
expenditures in total public expenditures in Western and Eastern Europe. It tests the 
coexistence of efficiency and compensation effects of globalization on the expenditure and 
the revenue sides of government budgets. In Western Europe, globalization leads to an 
increase in social expenditures; however these expenditures are to an increasing extent 
financed by taxes on labor. There are important differences between the welfare states. In the 
conservative regimes, both social expenditures and taxes on labor increase due to 
globalization. In the social-democratic regimes social expenditures are not affected by 
globalization, but ITR on labor increases, whereas ITR on capital and consumption decrease 
as a result of globalization. In the liberal regimes, the ITR on labor is rising, while social 
expenditures are declining. In the southern welfare regime globalization does not have any 
significant effects on the distribution of taxes or social spending. In Eastern Europe, in the 
Baltic States globalization leads to a decrease in social spending, whereas in the other Eastern 
European New Member States (post-communist European regimes) there is an upward 
convergence in social spending due to globalization. The ITR on consumption decrease due 
to globalization in the post-communist European regimes, whereas in the Baltics there is no 
robust significant effect of globalization on taxes.  
JEL Code: H23, H24, H25, H50, F19, F21 
Key words: globalization, social expenditures, implicit tax rates, welfare regimes 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper analyses the effects of globalization on social expenditures and the 
distribution of taxes, i.e. the tax burden on capital income, labor income, and consumption in 
Western and Eastern Europe with a focus on differences between welfare regimes.  
Tax competition theory argues that the increasing mobility of capital makes firms 
capable of avoiding taxes by choosing countries with a lower tax burden. Thus, capital 
mobility creates a pressure to reduce taxes on the mobile factor, which results in inefficiently 
low levels of capital taxes and public good provision (Oates, 1972; Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski, 1986). If government expenditures are held constant, a fall in capital taxes 
implies a shift of the tax burden to the immobile factor, i.e. labor. 
Regarding the expenditure side, there are two hypotheses on the impact of 
globalization. The efficiency hypothesis argues that globalization leads to increasing 
competition among nations to attract capital. This in turn leads to an erosion in tax revenues 
and a decline in public expenditures (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski; 1986 Garrett and 
Mitchell, 2001; Dreher et al., 2008a). Additionally, increasing competition changes the 
composition of public spending and leads to a shift from public goods to public inputs, i.e. a 
shift from expenditures that are mainly beneficial for residents to expenditures which aim at 
attracting capital (e.g. Keen and Marchand, 1997).   
The alternative hypothesis argues that globalization is accompanied by an increase in 
spending on public goods, in particular compensating social expenditures in response to 
increased external risks (Rodrik, 1998; Swank, 2002; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001).  
Although there is a rich empirical literature on the effects of globalization on either 
the spending or the revenue side of the government budget, studies that analyze the effects on 
both taxation and spending simultaneously are limited to Bretschger and Hettich (2002), 
Adam and Kammas (2007), Dreher (2006a) and Dreher et al. (2008a).  There is evidence for 
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a joint existence of the efficiency and compensation hypotheses, albeit via opposite effects on 
the two sides of the budget (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Adam and Kammas, 2007).  On 
the one hand the tax burden is shifting from capital to labor. On the other hand, social 
expenditures are increasing due to globalization. 
Our paper belongs to this strand of literature. Using two different sets of panel data 
for the old EU member states (EU15) and the Central and Eastern European New Member 
States (CEENMS), we estimate the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates (ITR) on 
capital, labor and consumption, and the share of social protection expenditures in total 
expenditures. Most studies focus on taxes on capital and labor, and omit the taxes on 
consumption. We measure globalization by the multi-dimensional KOF indices (Dreher, 
2006b; Dreher et al., 2008a), which capture not only the economic aspects such as trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), income payments to foreign nationals, portfolio investments, 
restrictions on trade and capital flows, but also the political and social dimensions of 
globalization.   
The first contribution of our paper is the focus on EU15 and the CEENMS. Secondly, 
we estimate whether the effects differ between the different welfare state regimes. Leibrecht 
et al. (2011) and Onaran et al. (2012) are the only studies in this literature that distinguishes 
the effects in different welfare regimes in Western Europe, but these papers are limited to 
either the effects on social expenditures or taxes only, whereas this paper shows that the 
forces of compensation and efficiency may work differently on the revenue and expenditure 
sides. They also do not account for differences within the CEENMS due to the short time 
series they use. We use an updated data set, which allows us to distinguish different regimes 
in the CEENMS. 
There is another strand of literature that focuses mainly on tax competition across 
jurisdictions based on corporate and capital gains taxes using spatial econometrics, which 
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finds that corporate taxes are driven down by external tax competition rather than by internal 
factors (Davies et al., 2003; Davies and Voget, 2008; Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch and 
Rincke, 2008). However, this literature focuses on taxes on capital, whereas our focus is to 
test how globalization affects the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget 
simultaneously. Furthermore, as Devereux et al. (2008) show, competitive downward 
pressure on the tax rates on capital is generated by the relaxation of capital controls –a 
variable incorporated in the KOF globalization indices among other variables. The advantage 
of using a common and broad measure of globalization, as in Bretschger and Hettich (2002), 
Adam and Kammas (2007), Dreher (2006a) and Dreher et al. (2008), is that we can test 
potential effects on different tax categories as well as social spending, whereas the spatial lag 
would be relevant mostly for taxes on the mobile factor of production.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two reviews the welfare state literature and 
its relevance for the effects of globalization. Section three describes the data and stylized 
facts. Section four and five presents the estimation methodology and the results. Section six 
concludes. 
2. Welfare regimes and globalization       
Welfare regimes, and hence national economic and political institutions matter, as 
they shape or narrow down how states react to globalization (Campbell, 2005; Scharpf and 
Schmidt, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Pierson (1996) argues that cuts in welfare spending 
have been slow and path-dependent following the crisis of the 1970s. Different constituencies 
within the population and citizens’ expectations of the responsibilities of the welfare states 
are created in an historical institutional context. Retrenchment initiatives are associated with 
high electoral costs; similarly existing commitments like pensions lock in policy makers 
(Pierson, 1996). However, path dependency does not mean that change does not occur, but it 
is conditional on the historical and institutional context; e.g. radical retrenchment has been 
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easier when there is a significant electoral slack, or budgetary crisis (Pierson, 1996). Hacker 
(2004) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that fundamental change can occur through 
incremental transformations of welfare state policies; e.g. through a slow process of 
privatization of welfare services. In some cases collective agreements between unions and 
employers may fill some gaps in welfare state provision (Trampusch, 2007; Yerkes, 2011; 
Johnston et al., 2011); thus an absence of spending by the state in response to globalization 
can be compensated for through a collectivization of risks by other actors. Change may also 
take the form of a shift in the focus of welfare spending under the pressure of new social risks 
linked to the changes in family structures, increasing female employment, working poor, 
precarious work, long-term unemployment  rather than a complete retrenchment (Bonoli, 
2007; Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Yerkes, 2011). Globalization may have caused 
some of these new risks like precarious employment, but the new risks, and their 
consequences for the change in the welfare states are a much broader topic. 
Different welfare states create different types of labor and business organizations and 
alliances, which have an impact on the tax and expenditures policy (Campbell, 2005). For 
example, in social-democratic countries tax rates on both capital and labor are the highest in 
Europe, since there is a consensus that the revenue is utilized to finance social expenditures. 
In contrast, if social expenditure is historically low, it may be difficult to increase it under the 
pressures of globalization, given the limits to tax increases (Kautto and Kvist, 2002).   
The varieties of capitalism approach of Hall and Soskice (2001) highlights the 
importance of social spending to firms in coordinated market economies, where 
unemployment benefits with high replacement rates can facilitate workers’ interest in 
investing in industry-specific skills, and coincide with the interests of firms in having access 
to pools of workers with high and specific skills. On the contrary, in the liberal welfare states, 
low levels of benefits coincide with firms’ preferences for fluid labor markets. Thus, since 
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firms have different strategies in different regimes, their demands about the responses of the 
states to globalization and risks also differ (Hall and Soskice, 2001). While it is likely to see 
cuts in social spending as a response to globalization in the liberal market economies, in the 
coordinated market economies the interests of both the firms and labor unions may lead to 
preserving social spending. 
Different welfare regimes also generate different norms about tax equity. Plümper et 
al. (2009) show that governments are restricted in how they react to tax competition by 
fairness norms as much as budget constraints, which prevent a wholesale race-to-the-bottom 
in capital taxation. 
In some cases globalization might also lead to a convergence of welfare states (Brady 
et al., 2005; Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006). In the case of less generous states globalization 
might cause upward convergence as a result of the demands of citizens in an era of political 
integration (Kautto and Kvist, 2002). 
For Western Europe, in a widely used classification Esping-Andersen (1999) groups 
countries into regimes depending on the degree of stratification, decommodification1, and the 
mix between private and public social security institutions: the social-democratic regime 
(Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway) characterized by a high decommodification index, 
little stratification and state provision of social security; the conservative regime (Germany, 
France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) where social security is 
provided partly by the state and partly by the market, but is strongly linked to the status of 
employment and to families, with a medium degree of decommodification; the liberal regime 
(United Kingdom, Ireland, United States) characterized by low decommodification and 
primarily market provision of social security. Esping-Andersen’s typology has been widely 
                                                     
1 Decommodification refers to public spending that reduce the reliance of the citizens 
on the market for some goods and services such as  unemployment benefits, health, and 
pension. 
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discussed and criticized; e.g. it has been proposed to reconsider the classification of countries, 
use further indicators regarding benefits other than cash-benefits, and integrate the gender 
aspects (Bambra, 2006; Kasza, 2002; Leibfried, 1992). Ferrara (1996) and Bonoli (1997) 
suggest a fourth southern regime including Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal with a higher 
degree of polarization than in the conservative regime and persistence of clientelism in the 
distribution of social services. The Netherlands is also argued to be a hybrid regime, which 
combines corporatist social insurance for workers with universal insurances, and more 
recently includes also liberal elements (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Clasen and van Oorschot, 
2002). Due to its wide use in the literature, we adapt an extended version of Esping-
Andersen’s classification by adding the southern welfare regime. We also do a robustness 
check by excluding the Netherlands from the sample due to its ambiguous character.  
We estimate the effects in the CEENMS separately, as these countries constitute 
welfare regimes in transition different from those in Western Europe. The specific aspects of 
the macroeconomic environment in the post-transition CEECs may also justify separate 
estimations. Due to the transition crisis extensive financial needs emerged, caused by 
increasing unemployment, early pension schemes and a decline of women’s participation in 
the labor force (Onaran, 2008). However, in an effort to attract FDI, the CEECs cut corporate 
income tax rates (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009) or introduced flat rate personal income taxes 
(Keen et al., 2008; Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). Finally the presence of a large informal 
economy led many governments to decrease tax rates to encourage formalization (Duman, 
2010). 
Although early studies position the CEECs within the liberal regime (e.g. Ferge, 2001; 
Standing, 1996), later studies argue that they form a separate welfare regime (Lelkes, 2000). 
Orenstein and Haas (2005) group all CEECs as well as other former Yugoslav republics in a 
European post-communist welfare regime and argue that the prospects of joining the EU 
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created a similar pattern of development via the accession process.  Differently, Fenger 
(2007) distinguishes a "post-communist European type" (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Croatia), a "former USSR type" (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, 
Russia and Belarus) and a group of developing welfare states (Georgia, Romania and 
Moldova). The post-communist European type in Fenger mixes characteristics of both the 
conservative and the social-democratic types. Bohle and Greskovits (2007) distinguish 
further regimes: a neoliberal type in the Baltic States, an embedded neoliberal type in the 
Visegrad states, and a neo-corporatist type in Slovenia. Compared to the more market-
oriented Baltic States, the Visegrad states are more socially inclusive. The least market-
oriented type is Slovenia with social indicators closer to West European standards.  
First, we estimate the effects of globalization in the CEENMS in aggregate, i.e. 
treating the CEENMS as a single welfare regime in transition as suggested by Orenstein and 
Haas (2005). Then in order to test whether there are different responses within the CEENMS, 
following the common point in both Fenger (2007) and Bohle and Greskovits (2007), we 
distinguish a separate Baltic regime, and group the other CEENMS as a post-communist 
European regime. It is not possible to classify Slovenia as a third regime due to the limited 
availability of time series data. 
3.  Data and Stylized Facts 
3.1. Globalization Globalization affects the governments’ decisions in several ways: 
Globalization may restrain governments via increased budgetary pressure due to trade 
liberalization and increased factor mobility. Increased world market integration through trade, 
FDI, portfolio investments may affect the domestic economy by increasing inequality and 
economic insecurity, and the citizens may seek to be compensated by the public sector. 
However, globalization goes beyond the economic dimensions, and incorporates also social, 
institutional and political aspects, exclusion of which could lead to biased estimates (Dreher 
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et al., 2008a). Therefore, we employ the KOF indices of economic, social, and political 
globalization (Dreher, 2006b; Dreher et al., 2008a). KOFecon is composed of the actual 
flows-index, which includes trade, FDI, income payments to foreign nationals and portfolio 
investments, and the index of restrictions on trade and capital flows. KOFglobal includes 
KOFecon as well as the index of social globalization, which consists of data on personal 
contact, information flows and cultural proximity, and the index on political globalization, 
which consists of data on the number of embassies and the membership in international 
organizations. The multi-dimensional KOF indices are a better way to reflect the joint effects 
of globalization compared to individual variables like FDI or trade or restrictions on capital 
flows (Leibrecht et al., 2011). The broader index including social and political globalization 
can incorporate further dimensions related to the influence of the practices in other countries 
on the aspirations of citizens; they also help to reflect issues of convergence, which may be 
determined via political and legislative processes in the EU.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the unweighted average KOF indices. All countries have 
experienced a significant and continuous increase in their exposure to globalization. The 
conservative and the liberal regimes show a similar development of the KOFecon, with the 
liberal regime’s index starting to rise already in the 1970s. KOFecon in the social-democratic 
regime started at a lower level, but experienced the highest increase. The southern regime has 
a lower index. The CEENMS also started from a lower level, but now have nearly reached 
the level of the EU-15. The development of the overall globalization index in the social-
democratic, conservative and liberal regimes are very similar. The catch-up process in the 
southern countries is also stronger, whereas the CEENMS have a remarkably lower index 
value throughout.  
3.2 The Tax Burden on Capital Income, Labor Income and Consumption 
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Different types of tax rates are used in empirical studies. Statutory tax rates (STRs) on 
capital or corporate income are directly derived from the tax code. However, they do not 
account for the tax base. Effective marginal and average tax rates likewise use data from the 
tax code. They measure the tax burden on a hypothetical investment project based on actual 
tax law (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Devereux et al., 2002). A third widely used measure is 
average effective tax rates (AETRs), calculated by dividing the total tax revenue from capital 
or corporate income, labor income or consumption by the pre-tax income or consumption 
(Mendoza et al., 1994; Carey and Rabesona, 2002). Eurostat is adapting this method to 
calculate implicit tax rates (ITRs).2 These tax rates are especially suitable for exploring 
changes in the tax burden. Therefore we base our analysis on the ITRs. 
For the ITRs Eurostat data is employed. The data source for the period starting in 
1990 is the Eurostat online database. These data are extended backwards to 1970 or 1980 
with the growth rates of the ITRs calculated by the EC (2000). The data on the ITR on capital 
for Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia are extended with our own calculations, based on the 
method used by the EC.3 Thus, the data for nine countries4 reaches back until 1970, for six 
countries5 until 1980, and for most CEENMS until 1995. 
Figures 3-5 show the development of the unweighted average of the ITR on capital 
income, labor income and on consumption. 
[Figure 3] 
Although STRs on capital decreased (Devereux et al., 2002), the ITR on capital 
stayed rather stable, due to the broadening of the tax base. The level of capital taxation is 
                                                     
2 Eurostat’s terminology for AETR is ITR. We will further use this terminology. 
3 The ITR on capital for Romania during 1998-2004, for Bulgaria for 1999 and 2002-
2007, for Slovenia during 1995-1999 are calculated as (capital taxes as share of GDP * GDP) 
/ (gross operating surplus - consumption of fixed capital) using data in Eurostat about the 
structure of taxes by function as share of GDP. 
4 Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
United Kingdom 
5 Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece Portugal, Sweden 
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much lower in the CEENMS compared to Western Europe. The ITR on capital has fallen in 
the liberal regimes (apart from a recent increase), while it has been rising in the social-
democratic regimes in particular since the mid 1990s. In the conservative regimes the ITR on 
capital slightly decreased over the whole period 1980-2007. In the southern regimes the ITR 
on capital had been considerably lower than in the other welfare state regimes until the 
beginning of the 1990s, but since then it has increased and now corresponds to that of the 
liberal regime. Given that the process of globalization has intensified in all these regimes, the 
differences in the developments in the ITRs are remarkable. There are important differences 
in the trends in the CEENMS as well. The ITR on capital fell strongly in Slovakia; 
maintained its initial levels in the Baltics despite an early period of decline, and remained 
quite stable in the other countries. It is interesting that this stability took place in the 
CEENMS in an era of major globalization.   
[Figure 4] 
The ITRs on labor are on average higher than those on capital. The difference 
between the ITR on capital and labor is much higher in the CEENMS. With the exception of 
the liberal regimes there is a converging trend in the ITRs on labor in the social-democratic, 
conservative and southern regimes. This goes along with the increase in globalization. 
Countries in the social-democratic welfare regimes have the highest ITR on labor. In the 
countries of both the post-communist European and the Baltic regimes the ITR on labor has 
been decreasing, albeit more strongly in the latter. All three Baltic States introduced flat tax 
very early in 1994-95, followed by Slovakia and Romania. 
[Figure 5] 
The social-democratic regimes have the highest ITR on consumption, and the 
southern regimes have the lowest ITR in the West, although it has been constantly increasing 
since 1980. The level of the ITR on consumption in the post-communist European regimes 
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corresponds to those of the conservative and liberal regimes, whereas the rate in the Baltics is 
slightly lower.  
3.3 Social Expenditures 
In order to capture the effect of globalization on the composition of spending with 
regard to public consumption goods, we focus on social expenditures, rather than 
intermediate spending categories like education or health, which are not only public 
consumption goods but also public inputs for the firms. We prefer normalizing social 
expenditures by total expenditures to normalizing by GDP in order to capture the effects on 
the distribution of spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Leibrecht et al., 2011).     
Eurostat’s classification of the functions of government (COFOG) database provides 
data on ‘social protection’ expenditure on sickness and disability, old age, family and 
children, survivors, unemployment and housing. However the COFOG data as a ratio to total 
expenditures in Eurostat is available only since 1990. The time series are extended with data 
from OECD National Accounts Vol. II. 
Figure 6 shows the development of the unweighted average of social expenditure as a 
ratio to total expenditures (socexp). 
[Figure 6] 
In the EU15 the social-democratic regimes have the highest share of social 
expenditures, which has been slightly rising since 1995. The trends in social spending 
indicate convergence among the social-democratic, conservative, and southern regimes 
towards similar levels as a share in total spending. It seems like globalization has not led to 
welfare state retrenchment in these regimes; however in order to pin down the effects of 
globalization, we need an econometric analysis after controlling for other explanatory factors. 
In the liberal regimes, the share of social expenditures increased until 1994 but since then has 
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decreased. In the CEENMS the share of social expenditures has been declining in both 
regimes, but the Baltics have a much lower share.  
4. Estimation Methodology 
We introduce a broad set of control variables common to both the spending and tax 
equations based on the previous empirical literature (e.g. Adam and Kammas, 2007; 
Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Dreher et al., 2008a and 2008b; Leibrecht et al., 2011; Swank 
and Steinmo, 2002; Gemmel et al., 2008; Sanz and Velazquez, 2007; Winner, 2005): the ratio 
of total expenditures of general government to GDP (expenditure), which captures the size of 
the public sector; government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP (debt), which 
reflects the budget constraint as well as alternative means of finance; the fraction of 
population older than 65 years as a share of total population (oldage), which captures the 
effect of the increasing proportion of the dependent population on the tax and expenditure 
system; the growth rate of real GDP (growth), which aims to capture cyclical effects; 
inflation measured as the change in the GDP deflator (inflation)6; ; government party 
(govparty), which reflects the composition of the government’s cabinet and ranges from 1 to 
5 (1 = hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties, 5 = hegemony of social-democratic and 
other left parties); a country’s relative size - the proportion of a country’s GDP to the average 
sample GDP- (size), which is included in order to avoid a possible small country bias in the 
coefficient of the globalization indices, as smaller countries are typically more open than 
larger.  Table A.1 in the appendix contain information on the variables and the databases.  
                                                     
6 In our sample period, there is only one year of hyperinflation (147%) in Romania in 
1997, where data for the ITR on capital starts in 1998. For all the other variables in Romania 
the data starts in 1999 or later; thus there are no hyperinflation years. For other countries, 
which have experienced hyperinflation (Bulgaria, and the Baltic states), our estimation period 
for which data for the dependent variables are available does not include any hyperinflation 
years. The results are robust to the exclusion of 1998 in Romania for the estimations for the 
ITR on capital regarding the effects of inflation as well as globalization indices. 
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We explore the effect of globalization on social expenditures and the various ITRs by 
using the following baseline model:  
𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗 =  𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝑗𝑗 + γjBji(t−1)  + 𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝐶𝑗𝑗−1 +  𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗   (1) 
where Bj=social expenditures as a ratio to total expenditures, the ITRs on capital 
income, labor income, or consumption, and the subscript j indicates different regressions with 
different dependent variables.7 We estimate separate equations for Western Europe and 
CEENMS to allow for country-group-specific coefficients. Thus, the country index, i, ranges 
from 1 to 15 for Western Europe and from 1 to 10 for the CEENMS; t is the time index 
ranging from 1970-2007 for the ITRs in Western Europe, 1980-2007 for social spending in 
Western Europe, and 1995-2007 in the CEENMS for all equations. 𝛼𝑗𝑗 are country fixed 
effects, ωjt are time fixed effects. 𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the error term.
8 𝐺𝑗𝑗−1 is the globalization index 
(KOFecon or KOFglobal), and 𝐶𝑗𝑗−1 is the matrix of control variables, all of which except for 
government cabinet gravity enter into the equations with a one year lag.  
The aim of using lagged explanatory variables is to incorporate the time lags in the 
decision process as well as to address the problems of endogeneity.9 Due to the low number 
of countries (cross-sections), a GMM-estimation to cope with endogeneity is not possible; 
therefore we follow Wooldridge’s (2002:301) suggestion to use lagged explanatory variables 
as a second best approach. The alternative of instrumental variables approach is also not 
                                                     
7 Our dependent variables as well as the explanatory variables are all ratios or growth 
rates, and panel unit roots reject the presence of unit roots; therefore we proceed with 
estimating the models in levels rather than differences. 
8 Following Leibrecht et al (2011) estimations are made using Schaffer’s xtivreg2 
Stata command (Schaffer, 2010), which allows for standard errors, which are fully robust with 
respect to serial correlation and general heteroscedasticity, as the variance-covariance-matrix 
of the error term is calculated using the approach developed by Newey and West (1987). The 
alternative cluster-robust standard errors need a large number of clusters for reliable inference 
(Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  
9 The government cabinet gravity is not lagged, since there is no endogeneity problem 
involved in this case. 
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reliable due to the absence of variables, which are highly correlated with globalization and 
the control variables but exogenous to taxes and spending. 
In order to account for path dependency a dynamic model using the Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator with lagged dependent variable is estimated. Again due to 
the low number of countries, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is not appropriate (also 
see Potrafke, 2009).  However, in the presence of fixed country effects, the results are biased 
for short time series (Nickell, 1981). For the EU15, where the time period is 1970-2007, this 
poses only minor problems. Judson and Owen (1999) shows that the LSDV estimator with 
lagged dependent variable performs well with unbalanced panels.10 However, for the 
CEENMS the time period is 1995-2007, thus much shorter; therefore the results for the 
CEENMS must be interpreted as indicative. 
The total expenditure as a control variable also captures the dynamic effects of path 
dependency and introduces a common exogenous constraint on both the revenue and the 
social expenditure side. 
A note about the bounded nature of the share of social expenditures and the ITRs is in 
place here: OLS assumes that the dependent variables are unbounded; however, this does not 
pose a major problem in our case, since our dependent variables are far from the bounds (0 
                                                     
10 We nevertheless estimated the Arellano and Bover (1995)-Blundell and Bond 
(1998), two-step estimation using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction and orthogonal 
deviations. However, the Hansen-J test indicates overfitting (p-value of 1) and there is 
second-order autocorrelation; thus minimum requirements for reliable estimates are not met. 
Given the low number of countries in our sample, as Roodman (2009) suggests, Arellano and 
Bover-Blundell and Bond estimator may face the problem of an overabundance of 
instruments, which inflates the p-values of the Hansen-J test results. We also estimated the 
bias-corrected LSDV estimator developed by Bruno (2005) with the Blundell and Bond as 
the initial estimator, however, to derive the bias-correction term Bruno estimator needs a 
consistent first round estimator, and thus also relies on Blundell-Bond estimates, which are 
not appropriate in our case as discussed above. Furthermore, Bruno estimator needs strictly 
exogenous variables, and is not applicable in the presence of even only weakly exogenous 
regressors.     
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and 100). Moreover, Winner (2005) shows that logistic transformation does not change the 
results; but the interpretation of coefficients becomes complicated.  
Next we test for the heterogeneity of the effects of globalization in different welfare 
state regimes by extending Equation (1) as follows: 
𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗 =  𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝑗𝑗 + +γjBji(t−1)+  βjgGi(t−1) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗−1𝑛𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐶𝑗𝑗−1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑇𝑛−1𝑗=1 +   𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗              (2) 
where 𝐷𝑗 is a dummy variable representing the different welfare regimes. In Western 
Europe 𝐷1, 𝐷2, and 𝐷3 stand for the social-democratic, southern and liberal regimes 
respectively. The conservative regime is the base regime. In the CEENMS 𝐷1 stands for the 
Baltic regimes, and the post-communist European regime is the base regime.  We do not add 
the regime intercept dummies, since we already have country specific fixed effects. Due to 
limitations of degrees of freedom, we have interaction dummies only for the globalization 
indices; thus the coefficients of the control variables remain the same across the regimes. 
However, a welfare regime specific trend is also included in order to account for regime 
specific shocks, which are not captured by the control variables or the common time 
dummies as in Leibrecht et al (2011). Due to the presence of time dummies, one welfare 
specific trend is excluded.  
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 EU15 
Table 1 shows the results for the basic specification for the EU15. In all 
specifications, the lagged dependent variables are significant with a positive sign, verifying 
the importance of path dependency in spending and taxes. The time dummies are jointly 
significant in all specifications except the specification with KOFglobal in the estimation of 
ITR on labor (Column (5)). We keep the time dummies as well as other explanatory variables 
even if they are insignificant, and discuss the robustness of the results where relevant. The 
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effects of the globalization indices are robust to the exclusion of the other explanatory 
variables. 
In the EU15 an increase of economic globalization (KOFecon) has a positive effect on 
social expenditures as a ratio to total expenditures, whereas overall globalization 
(KOFglobal) is insignificant. Countries seem to be compensating for increasing risk caused 
by economic globalization by augmenting social expenditures. This compensation effect is in 
line with Gemmel et al. (2008), Hicks and Swank (1992), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), 
Dreher et al. (2008b) and Leibrecht et al. (2011), although the measure of globalization may 
differ among the studies. However, Dreher (2006a), Sanz and Velazquez (2007), Dreher et al. 
(2008a), and Potrafke (2009) find no significant effect of globalization on social expenditures, 
but the results are not directly comparable, since they are very sensitive to country coverage, 
as we will show below.   
[Table 1] 
Regarding the effect of globalization on taxation, there is no significant effect on the 
ITR on capital (Columns (3) and (4)). This is in line with Dreher et al. (2008a), Swank (2006) 
and Swank and Steinmo (2002). However, Winner (2005) finds a negative effect of 
globalization on the ITR on capital income, while Dreher (2006a) finds a positive effect. 
Adam and Kammas (2007), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), as well as Bretschger (2010) 
likewise find a negative effect of globalization using the ITRs on corporate income as 
dependent variables. However, their measures of globalization are limited to trade volume, 
and different indices to measure legal restrictions. The results are furthermore sensitive to the 
country sample.  
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Columns (5) and (6) show the results for the ITR on labor. Economic globalization 
index (KOFecon) has a positive effect.11 While there is no effect on taxes on capital, the tax 
burden on the immobile factor is rising due to globalization. This positive effect is in line 
with Dreher et al. (2008a), Adam and Kammas (2007) and Winner (2005). Likewise, 
Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Garret and Mitchell (2001) and Schwarz (2007) find a shift of 
the tax burden from capital  to labor, when estimating the ratio of taxes on capital to labor. 
Nevertheless, Dreher (2006a) finds no effect and Swank and Steinmo (2002) find a negative 
effect on taxes on labor; however the latter study uses only the capital controls index as the 
measure of globalization.   
Globalization has no significant effect on the ITR on consumption (Columns 7-8). 
Next, Table 2 reports the results for the four welfare state regimes in Western 
Europe.12 The lagged dependent variables as well as the common time fixed effects are 
jointly significant in all specifications. The F-tests on joint significance of the coefficients 
(base group of the conservative regime plus the interaction dummy for the other three 
regimes) are reported at the end of each specification. 
[Table 2] 
There are significant differences between the four welfare state regimes. Overall 
globalization has a positive effect on social expenditures in the conservative regime, while in 
the liberal regime globalization is leading to a decline in social expenditures (Column 1). In 
the social-democratic and southern regimes social expenditures are not affected by 
globalization. Interestingly economic globalization has no statistically significant effect in 
any of the regimes as opposed to the findings in the aggregate estimation. This shows that it 
is mostly the social and political integration that shape the demands of the citizens in the case 
                                                     
11 In this specification, when the time effects, which are jointly insignificant, are 
excluded, KOFglobal is also statistically significant and positive. 
12 As a robustness check, we also exclude the Netherlands from the sample due to its 
arguably hybrid character as discussed in Section 2; the results are robust. 
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of the conservative regimes; this may be linked to aspirations driven by the social-democratic 
models in Europe. Globalization is leading to a convergence of the conservative regime with 
lower social spending level towards the social-democratic regime, as suggested in the 
political economy literature (e.g. Kautto and Kvist, 2002; Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006; 
Achterberg and Yerkes, 2009; Huber and Stephens, 2001). There is no general race-to-the-
bottom in terms of welfare regimes in the case of the conservative regimes. Meinhard and 
Potrafke (2012) also find that social globalization has a positive effect on aggregate 
government spending, while economic globalization has no effect in a larger sample of 186 
countries as well as the OECD countries, and interpret their finding as evidence of a catch-up 
effect as more people have been globally interconnected and observed government sector in 
other countries.   
The negative effect of overall globalization in the liberal regimes however indicates 
that catching-up convergence is specific to the conservative regimes. In the liberal regime the 
negative effect of overall globalization without any significant effect of economic 
globalization may be an indicator that social spending cuts were motivated by a discourse 
about increasing competitive pressures in a period of rapid political integration across Europe 
although the economic pressures themselves were not significant, and these countries had a 
higher exposure to economic globalization compared to other regimes already back in the 
1970s.   
The lack of a significant effect in the southern as well as social-democratic regimes 
indicates that in these countries domestic factors and path dependency are more important than 
international effects in driving social expenditures.  
Our results, based on a different database with longer time series and a dynamic rather 
than a static model are similar to Leibrecht et al. (2011) in the case of the conservative 
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regime, but they do not find the negative effect in the liberal regime, while they find some 
negative effect in the case of the social-democratic regime.13     
Regarding the effect of globalization on taxes, the results are reported in columns (3) 
to (8). In the social-democratic regime, rising globalization is leading to decreasing taxes on 
capital, whereas in the other regimes there is no significant effect. It can be argued that in the 
social-democratic regime, where capital taxes have been significantly higher, globalization is 
leading to a downward convergence.   
Globalization leads to a rise in taxes on labor in the conservative, social-democratic, 
and liberal regimes, although in the latter two only KOFecon is significant.  There is no 
significant effect in the southern regime. Even though labor taxes in the southern regime have 
been rising more strongly than in the other regimes, apparently this rise is not caused by 
globalization, but by domestic factors. The economic significance of the effect is largest in 
the social-democratic regime.14   
Finally, economic globalization has a negative effect on the ITR on consumption in 
the conservative and social-democratic regimes.  
5.2 CEENMS 
Table 3 reports the results for the CEENMS pooled together. In all specifications, the 
lagged dependent variables are significant with a positive sign.   
[Table 3] 
                                                     
13 Leibrecht et al (2011) use COFOG database which starts only in 1990s. Our 
database for the Western European countries dates back to 1980s for some countries. 
14 In the social-democratic regime globalization has led to a 2.9%-point increase in the 
ITR on labor, and 1.5%-point and 1.1%-point increases in the liberal and conservative 
regimes respectively. 
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In the CEENMS there is no effect of globalization on social expenditures as opposed 
to Western Europe.15 Interestingly, economic globalization is exerting an upward pressure on 
the ITR on capital16, whereas there is no statistically significant effect of globalization on the 
ITR on labor. There is a statistically significant negative effect of both globalization indices 
on the ITR on consumption. Leibrecht et al. (2011) find a negative effect of globalization on 
social expenditures; however their model is static, and their estimation period is 2000-2006 
for most of the CEENMS, whereas our data cover the period of 1995-2007; i.e. also the 
earlier period of catching-up with European welfare standards.    
Next, we repeat the estimations for two different regimes in the CEENMS, i.e. a post-
communist European type, and a Baltic type. Table 4 reports the results. The lagged 
dependent variables are again significant.  
[Table 4] 
Our results indicate differences in the effects of globalization on taxes and spending in 
the Baltic countries and the other CEENMS, and provide some support to the arguments in 
Fenger (2007) and Bohle and Greskovits (2007) about different welfare regimes in the 
CEENMS. In the post-communist European regime the effect of globalization (KOFglobal) 
on social expenditures is significant and positive, but in the Baltic countries there is a 
significant negative effect of both indices. When the regime specific differences are 
controlled for, there is no significant effect of globalization (both indices) on the ITR on 
capital in any of the regimes. In the post-communist European type we find a negative effect 
                                                     
15 However, when the jointly insignificant time dummies are excluded, we find a 
positive effect of KOFecon on social expenditures. This seemingly non-robust finding will be 
discussed further below with respect to the differences between welfare regimes. 
16 When the jointly insignificant time dummies are excluded, there is no statistically 
significant effect of globalization on taxes on capital. 
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of economic globalization on the ITRs on consumption reflecting the effects of flat tax 
reforms.17 
6. Conclusion 
Globalization has significant effects on the government budgets; however, the 
responses of the states are shaped by the economic and political institutions in different 
welfare regimes. 
In Western Europe globalization leads to an increase in social expenditures. However, 
these expenditures are financed by taxes on labor. Overall on the expenditure side the 
compensation hypothesis is verified whereas on the revenue side efficiency pressures prevail. 
These two hypotheses are complementary rather than competing. 
This outcome is, however, dominated by the trends in the conservative regime. There 
is evidence of catching-up convergence in the conservative regime towards the social-
democratic regime regarding social expenditures in response to political and social 
globalization. This can be interpreted as further decommodification in the conservative 
regimes towards the higher levels in the social-democratic regimes; however this is financed 
by higher taxes on labor. In the social-democratic regime, there is no evidence of welfare 
retrenchment in response to globalization, but the continuity of social spending is maintained 
by decreasing tax burden on capital and increasing taxes on labor; thus efficiency effects 
prevail on the revenue side. Further increases in labor tax can be evaluated as part of the 
social-democratic consensus to preserve the welfare regime without increasing the burden on 
capital. The decline in the ITR on consumption, which is a regressive tax, offsets part of the 
increase in the tax burden on labor in the conservative and social-democratic regimes. In the 
liberal regime, the ITR on labor increases as a consequence of globalization, whereas social 
                                                     
17 When the jointly insignificant time effects are excluded, there is significant positive 
effect of KOFecon on the ITR on capital in the Baltic countries. The low levels of the taxes in 
the Baltics might have helped to decrease informalization, and increase capital tax revenues 
as Duman (2010) suggests.    
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spending decreases; thus there is evidence of efficiency effects of globalization on both the 
revenue and expenditure sides. In the southern regime globalization does not have any 
significant effects on the distribution of taxes or social spending, which is puzzling given the 
presence of overall upward convergence in social spending and taxes in these countries. Our 
results indicate that this convergence has been mainly due to internal factors rather than 
economic, political, or social globalization.  
In the CEENMS, there are also important differences between the two regimes: 
Globalization leads to compensating effects on social spending and catching-up convergence 
only in the post-communist European regime, but negative efficiency effects prevail in the 
Baltics. The post-communist European regime resembles the Western conservative regime in 
its compensating response to globalization; however the effects on taxes are rather different. 
In the post-communist European type we find a negative effect of globalization on the ITRs 
on consumption, and no significant effect taxes on labor or capital. In the case of the Baltics, 
where flat tax reforms took place earlier, we do not observe any robust significant effect of 
globalization on taxes. .   
There is no general race-to-the-bottom in terms of social spending in the case of the 
conservative regimes or some CEENMS. However, the negative effects of globalization on 
social spending in the liberal regimes in Western Europe and the Baltic States with already 
low levels of social spending indicate that globalization may enhance the divergences 
between the liberal regimes and other member states. Furthermore, globalization leads to an 
increase in the tax burden on labor or a decline in the tax burden on capital in Western 
Europe. In order to shed light on the exact institutional and political processes that have 
generated these outcomes, further qualitative research is required about the alliances and 
framing of the discourses.  
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Figure 1: KOF - Economic globalisation grouped by welfare regimes; 1970-2007 
 
 
 
Figure 2: KOF Globalisation index grouped by welfare state regime; 1970-2007 
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Note: Due to shorter time series for some countries, the aggregation for the regimes start only at a common year, as the aggregation of the unbalanced data for a regime could impose 
a misleading change in the trend. For the post-communist European regime the aggregation for the ITR on capital income includes only the years 2001-2005, the aggregation for the 
ITR on labor income and consumption includes the years 1999-2007. For the social protection expenditures the aggregation for the liberal regime includes only the years 1990-2007, 
for the social-democratic regime, the conservative regime and the southern regime the years 1995-2007, for the post-communist European regime 2002-2007 and the Baltic regime 
2000-2007. 
Data Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2000), OECD National Accounts Vol. II 
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Table 1. Estimation results for the EU15, 1970 – 2007* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.012 -0.043                0.030 -0.018                
(0.708) (0.443)                (0.172) (0.194)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.044** 0.038   0.032** -0.010   
(0.037) (0.515)   (0.044) (0.336)   
size(t-1) 0.000 -0.021 1.042** 1.050** 0.057 0.127 0.035 0.002   
-1000 (0.938) (0.014) (0.016)   (0.674) (0.313) (0.697) (0.978)   
growth(t-1) -0.194*** -0.205*** 0.163 0.147   -0.002 -0.013 0.039 0.043   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.161) (0.217)   (0.955) (0.689) (0.153) (0.115)   
inflation(t-1) -0.036 -0.044 -0.059 -0.056   0.034 0.027 0.013 0.017   
(0.409) (0.327) (0.508) (0.502)   (0.106) (0.211) (0.512) (0.411)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.014 -0.008   0.099*** 0.092*** 0.010 0.011   
(0.008) (0.007) (0.820) (0.897)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.444)   
debt(t-1) -0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.003   0.009 0.011** -0.006 -0.007*  
(0.641) (0.487) (0.930) (0.803)   (0.103) (0.042) (0.145) (0.071)   
oldage(t-1) 0.204 0.165 0.498 0.448   0.193** 0.213** 0.067 0.051   
(0.122) (0.207) (0.148) (0.207)   (0.025) (0.011) (0.269) (0.398)   
govparty -0.061 -0.056 -0.054 -0.054   -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012   
(0.235) (0.288) (0.641) (0.638)   (0.629) (0.925) (0.846) (0.618)   
L.socexp 0.724*** 0.702***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR capital 0.742*** 0.741***
(0.000) (0.000)   
L.ITR labour 0.717*** 0.716***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR consumption 0.833*** 0.834***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.821 0.823 0.702 0.702   0.931 0.931 0.837 0.837   
N 268 268 381 381 399 399 399 399
ftestTD 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.226 0.050 0.000 0.000   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option; 
F-test TD = p-values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total
expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
 
 
*1980-2007 for social expenditures 
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Table 2. Estimation results for the EU15 – 4 regimes, 1970 – 2007*
*1980-2007 for social expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.115*** 0.061                0.051* -0.031                
(0.002) (0.478)                (0.069) (0.121)                
KOFglobal*socdem(~1) -0.189*** -0.441**                -0.013 -0.002                
(0.001) (0.022)                (0.791) (0.965)                
KOFglobal*south(t-1) -0.076 -0.174*                -0.087** 0.002                
(0.185) (0.094)                (0.023) (0.963)                
KOFglobal*lib(t-1) -0.417*** -0.185                -0.065 -0.017                
(0.000) (0.199)                (0.138) (0.609)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.044 0.005   0.045** -0.033** 
(0.212) (0.952)   (0.016) (0.042)   
KOFecon*socdem(t-1) -0.055 -0.212*  0.031 -0.002   
(0.115) (0.070)   (0.306) (0.952)   
KOFecon*south(t-1) -0.107** 0.023   -0.007 0.026   
(0.024) (0.848)   (0.854) (0.375)   
KOFecon*lib(t-1) -0.117 0.263   0.021 0.056*  
(0.134) (0.207)   (0.618) (0.096)   
size(t-1) 0.004 0.026 1.185** 0.951** 0.062 0.049 -0.014 -0.062   
(0.988) (0.922) (0.017) (0.035)   (0.589) (0.643) (0.883) (0.497)   
growth(t-1) -0.145*** -0.190*** 0.197* 0.156   0.017 0.002 0.047* 0.049*  
(0.002) (0.000) (0.076) (0.179)   (0.603) (0.945) (0.084) (0.082)   
inflation(t-1) 0.005 -0.027 0.025 0.001   0.067*** 0.057** 0.025 0.026   
(0.919) (0.591) (0.802) (0.995)   (0.003) (0.012) (0.303) (0.270)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.118*** 0.071* 0.005 -0.002   0.117*** 0.108*** 0.012 0.015   
(0.004) (0.074) (0.933) (0.976)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.413) (0.327)   
debt(t-1) 0.002 -0.007 0.001 0.004   0.020*** 0.023*** -0.006 -0.007   
(0.807) (0.444) (0.955) (0.817)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.145) (0.119)   
oldage(t-1) 0.047 0.180 0.404 0.070   -0.131 -0.192* -0.054 -0.071   
(0.805) (0.335) (0.373) (0.875)   (0.199) (0.080) (0.549) (0.434)   
govparty -0.012 -0.026 -0.025 -0.006   -0.047 -0.039 0.006 -0.005   
(0.832) (0.635) (0.824) (0.953)   (0.172) (0.248) (0.821) (0.862)   
trend_socialdem 0.222*** 0.092** 0.466*** 0.338** -0.022 -0.084** 0.006 0.017   
(0.000) (0.034) (0.007) (0.022)   (0.623) (0.032) (0.856) (0.597)   
trend_southern 0.135** 0.162** 0.344** 0.132   0.232*** 0.150*** 0.049 0.017   
(0.050) (0.018) (0.019) (0.428)   (0.000) (0.005) (0.261) (0.641)   
trend_liberal 0.279*** 0.005 0.116 -0.190   0.052 -0.014 -0.005 -0.048*  
(0.002) (0.925) (0.316) (0.239)   (0.173) (0.672) (0.848) (0.070)   
socexp(t-1) 0.588*** 0.666***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
ITR capital(t-1) 0.685*** 0.706***
(0.000) (0.000)   
ITR labor(t-1) 0.654*** 0.625***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
ITR consumption(t-1) 0.806*** 0.799***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.844 0.832 0.720 0.720   0.937 0.938 0.841 0.841   
N 268 268 381 381 399 399 399 399
ftestTD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.046 0.012 0.000 0.000   
ftest_socialdem 0.150 0.680 0.023 0.054   0.409 0.002 0.328 0.096   
ftest_south 0.431 0.110 0.196 0.764   0.268 0.293 0.351 0.796   
ftest_liberal 0.000 0.296 0.290 0.119   0.692 0.059 0.103 0.401   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option; F-test TD = p-
values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax
rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3. Estimation results for the CEENMS, 1995-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.213 0.088                -0.045 -0.116*                
(0.304) (0.412)                (0.562) (0.067)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.089 0.099*  0.026 -0.070** 
(0.277) (0.083)   (0.444) (0.026)   
size(t-1) -24.661** -24.168** 1311 -1133 1522 1649 -2142 0.077   
(0.019) (0.016) (0.840) (0.849)   (0.729) (0.665) (0.659) (0.987)   
growth(t-1) -0.236* -0.214* 0.092 0.108   -0.122** -0.127** -0.013 -0.032   
(0.074) (0.094) (0.358) (0.260)   (0.045) (0.040) (0.770) (0.485)   
inflation(t-1) -0.109 -0.093 0.061* 0.061*  -0.074*** -0.073*** 0.010 0.007   
(0.143) (0.208) (0.054) (0.056)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.521) (0.640)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.027 0.028 -0.075 -0.076   0.042 0.047 0.087** 0.088** 
(0.832) (0.827) (0.361) (0.342)   (0.345) (0.304) (0.015) (0.013)   
debt(t-1) 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.023   0.050** 0.048** -0.037** -0.038***
(0.544) (0.583) (0.241) (0.228)   (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006)   
oldage(t-1) -2.129*** -1.811** 0.828 1.089** -0.323 -0.303 -0.134 -0.357   
(0.005) (0.026) (0.137) (0.040)   (0.294) (0.384) (0.660) (0.235)   
govparty -0.499* -0.491* 0.049 0.014   -0.120 -0.121 -0.263** -0.249** 
(0.076) (0.072) (0.639) (0.895)   (0.242) (0.228) (0.021) (0.029)   
L.socexp 0.401*** 0.412***                
(0.008) (0.007)                
L.ITR capital 0.848*** 0.851***
(0.000) (0.000)   
L.ITR labour 0.529*** 0.526***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR consumption 0.460*** 0.458***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.539 0.538 0.726 0.734   0.737 0.737 0.673 0.679   
N 84 84 101 101 108 108 108 108
ftestTD 0.162 0.214 0.375 0.347   0.106 0.022 0.000 0.000   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option; 
F-test TD = p-values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total
expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4. Estimation results for the CEENMS – 2 regimes, 1995-2007  
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.397* -0.050                -0.066 -0.108                
(0.076) (0.769)                (0.501) (0.164)                
KOFglobal*baltic(-0.684*** 0.265                -0.096 -0.036                
(0.005) (0.395)                (0.578) (0.836)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.147 0.041   -0.014 -0.078** 
(0.127) (0.605)   (0.744) (0.022)   
KOFecon*baltic(t-1) -0.249** 0.188   -0.100 -0.038   
(0.037) (0.262)   (0.292) (0.704)   
size(t-1) -23.593** -23.851** -4371 -3274 -2649 -1673 -2143 -0.746   
(0.028) (0.016) (0.599) (0.622)   (0.597) (0.686) (0.668) (0.875)   
growth(t-1) -0.179 -0.194 0.112 0.101   -0.057 -0.063 -0.008 -0.014   
(0.153) (0.127) (0.263) (0.293)   (0.338) (0.280) (0.868) (0.774)   
inflation(t-1) -0.126* -0.113 0.076*** 0.073** -0.065*** -0.066*** 0.009 0.008   
(0.074) (0.125) (0.009) (0.011)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.584) (0.601)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.094 0.063 -0.111 -0.095   0.024 0.025 0.091** 0.085** 
(0.450) (0.616) (0.270) (0.267)   (0.615) (0.572) (0.042) (0.035)   
debt(t-1) 0.014 0.019 0.031 0.027   0.057*** 0.056*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.703) (0.595) (0.164) (0.179)   (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)   
oldage(t-1) -2.854** -2.797** 1.811** 1.586** 0.817** 0.755** -0.100 -0.094   
(0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)   (0.033) (0.031) (0.805) (0.801)   
govparty -0.442 -0.432 -0.038 -0.045   -0.171** -0.155* -0.260** -0.255** 
(0.162) (0.149) (0.761) (0.708)   (0.041) (0.055) (0.029) (0.023)   
trend*baltic 1.071** 0.628 -0.628 -0.450   -0.193 -0.185 0.039 -0.026   
(0.014) (0.101) (0.241) (0.216)   (0.480) (0.304) (0.900) (0.901)   
L.socexp 0.389*** 0.419***                
(0.003) (0.004)                
L.ITR capital 0.800*** 0.816***
(0.000) (0.000)   
L.ITR labour 0.531*** 0.527***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR consumption 0.459*** 0.452***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.564 0.551 0.735 0.740   0.766 0.765 0.674 0.683   
N 84 84 101 101 108 108 108 108
ftestTD 0.158 0.249 0.373 0.350   0.203 0.118 0.000 0.000   
ftest_baltic 0.191 0.435 0.280 0.093   0.180 0.170 0.310 0.216   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option;
F-test TD = p-values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total
expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption; *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Data Sources and description 
 
 
  
 
